General William W. Loring, formerly of the United States Army as colonel of the regiment of Mounted Riflemen, and distinguished in the Mexican war, afterward a major general in the Confederate army and for many years since our war as Pasha in the Egyptian army, but at present a resident of Florida, received the representative of the HERALD and his request for an interview on Egyptian affairs with ready and agreeable acquiescence, in his quarters at the New York Hotel. A compact, well proportioned figure, about five feet seven inches in height; a Napoleonic head, covered with fine black hair slightly streaked with gray; black, active eyes, a prominent nose, a heavy gray mustache and imperial adorning a swarthy and expressive face, establish altogether a striking personnel, which is heightened by an empty sleeve looped to the left breast, a souvenir of the struggle at the Garita de Belen, of the city of Mexico, which, with a soldierly manner, remind one, on meeting General Loring, of the gallant Phil Kearny, as he appeared in ’62 and ’63. The General looks about fifty.

Entering without hesitation at once into the subject General Loring briefly related his experience in Egypt, touched upon her recent history, which has led to the exciting military campaign now going on in that distracted country, and discussed its possibilities and results in a graphic manner, with occasional flashes of eloquence and humor.

As nearly as his rapidly delivered utterances could be caught they were substantially as follows:—

“I was in the Egyptian service for the period of ten years, and had the rank of Fereek Pacha, one of the highest military grades. I went to Egypt under contract with the Khedive, so that I might remain for some years and yet not jeopardize my citizenship in the United States. During my first year’s service I was actively employed as Inspector General, which enabled me to know the army thoroughly and obliged me to travel all over Egypt. At the end of the year the Khedive sent for me in person and ordered the Minister of War to place the entire coast of Egypt and its fortifications, including the navy, under my command, with my headquarters at Alexandria. The greater part of this command I held for over six years, and could have kept it until my departure had I felt so disposed. I left it temporarily to participate in the Abyssinian war late in 1875. In taking final leave of Ismail, then Khedive, I was requested by him to remain in his service; but my affairs in the United States requiring attention I declined. Had I known that he was pressed by both England and France to abdicate I would have stayed to help him all I could. With Tewfik Pacha, now Khedive, my intercourse was more personal. Now and then in his capacity of Minister of the Interior I had interviews with him.”

“Did you know Arabi Pacha?”

“Arabi Pacha served under my command for more than six years, commanding a regiment of 2,500 men. I learned from constant intercourse to know him well. He is of large size, over six feet high, well made, lithe and active, full of energy and ability. He was reserved and rarely exchanged a word with a foreigner, unless in official connection, as with one like myself. I never heard him speak of but one foreigner, Colonel Ward, for whose admirable character as a man and an officer he had the most unbounded admiration. He liked Americans, and never ceased saying that they were the only foreigners whom he had welcomed to his country. They were the only ones, he believed, who had ever taken an interest in his race. He had a mortal hatred of the Circassian and Turk. The former he looked upon as coming from the hotbed of the harem, and whose influence had undeservedly placed them over the civil and military administration of his country, and it was rarely that any of his race obtained office except by accident or through some one of these slaves or their minions in official position. My Arab Adjutant General, Loutfi Bey, like himself a pure blooded Arab, was born in a mud hut, and, like him, educated in the military school. Both of them afterward by great industry improved themselves and were among the best informed Arabs in Egypt; gentle and amiable in character, and, according to their idea of morals, very religious. Loutfi, who was with me for ten years, was his most intimate friend and adviser, and I think he is with him still. They prayed together five times a day, and never approached the throne of Allah without washing themselves, so as to be pure in person, as they were, according to their understanding, in heart.”

“What do you mean by washing themselves?”

“It is a very peculiar ceremony to witness. It is performed in public in this manner:—A Mohammedan begins by washing his right hand and arm to the elbow, saying a prayer; then the left, then the right side of the face and the left; after that the right and left foot and leg to the knee successively, saying a prayer at each ablution. When this is finished he spreads his rug, and upon it he stands erect with hands high uplifted, with eyes directed toward the tomb of the Prophet and repeats a prayer; he then bends forward with hands resting upon his knees and repeats another, then; prostrating himself, with forehead touching the ground, prays again; he sits upon his ankles and concludes his prayers, and finally, in that position, turns his face to the left calling to Eblis for protection from evil spirits, and lastly to the right, invoking the protection of good spirits. The hours of an Arab’s prayers are at daylight, nine A.M., midday, sunset and on retiring. This ceremony is called ‘zikr.’”

“You speak of Loutfi Bey and Arabi as personal friends. Is there any significance in that?”

“Yes there is. I was aware for many years that they were in close connection with the religious Mohammedan element, and I knew many of the leading men of the different societies with whom they were in contact and intimate association, but their names have escaped me. Though Arabi had a large, amiable eye, speaking only the Arabic and eloquent of speech, it was impossible to tell what there was behind it. Oppressed, and living under a despotism, a humiliated race, compelled to suffer in silence a blow from a coward in authority, it was only among their most intimate friends and in secret that they dared to say their souls were their own. Though I am able now to trace design in these men I never supposed that Arabi would be the leader of a great revolution, though an oracle with the military; that he would be also backed by nine-tenths of the people of Egypt and his battle cry be heard along North Africa, Arabia, Syria, Turkey and India.”

“By the way, General, it would aid our understanding very materially if we had a reliable map. Have you one of the seat of war in Egypt?”

“Yes, here is one which is correct and comprehensive. It is at your service.”

“Will you describe the boundaries of and the principal features within the theatre of war, and where there are likely to be military operations?”

“A modern army cannot march along the left bank of the Nile, the route taken by Napoleon in 1798, without interminable difficulty. Alexandria, Aboukir and Damietta are the only sites on the coast where an army can get a lodgement from which to march into the interior. This must be done in the early spring and through the summer to the month of August. After that the inundation makes it troublesome, unless by railroad. Later than that even the railroad can be flooded—certainly in the latter part of September and in the month of October, when the Nile is at its height. Lakes Mareotis and Etko, lying in front of Alexandria and between it and Rosetta, give Arabi a line of defence. Availing himself of it he has taken the line of Kafr-el-Douar, seventeen miles from Alexandria, which is no doubt only for delay, and to keep up his communication with Aboukir and Rosetta as long as possible and to hold the dike a few miles east of Aboukir and fifteen east of Alexandria. It will be remembered that when the English bearded Napoleon in 1798 they attempted to drown him out by cutting the dike. This is the barrier between the Mediterranean Sea and the inner land and many feet below the level of the sea. It is but a short distance from the Aboukir forts, and commanded by them. When cut by the English at that time they mercilessly drowned out from sixty to a hundred villages and a vast extent of cultivatable land for the Egyptians. This is one of his reasons for holding this line. The country flooded at that time was from ten to fifteen miles wide and from sixty to one hundred miles long, separating a strip of the coast, including Alexandria, Aboukir and Rosetta, from immediate communication with the interior. This land had been drained for thousands of years by the ancient Egyptians, who first established the dike, shutting out the sea and reducing the water to a mere nominal fresh water lake. Before it was destroyed by the English centuries of the Nile inundation had rendered this country extremely fertile, and it was one of the most beautiful gardens of all Egypt. The ancients had vast structures and enormous convents throughout its extent. These convents were used by the early Christians.

“It was here that Cleopatra and Mark Antony had their vineyards, from which the most delicious wines then in the world were obtained for their grand banquets and the most beautiful and sweetly perfumed flowers to deck them with. Subsequently, through the many invasions of poor Egypt, these beautiful gardens and the grand buildings were levelled in the dust, and finally, through the vandalism of grim visaged war, by our boasted Western civilization and the ambition of the two great nations of that day, a paradise, without regard to life or property, was suddenly converted into a vast waste of waters. History may repeat itself and give the world another opportunity to denounce the barbarian who now leads the national party of Egypt, when the poisoned chalice is presented to another, for having dared to follow a well remembered precedent. There are also Lakes Boorlos, between Rosetta and the fertile lands near Damietta and Lake Menzaleh, between Damietta and Port Said, which secure the coast, except at the places named. These lakes are the only remains of the five great branches of the Nile, which added so much to the fertility of ancient Egypt. It will be thus noticed how easily Egypt is defensible on the Mediterranean.”

“How about railroad communication?”

“There is a railroad from Alexandria to Cairo, 181 miles, and one on the west bank of the Nile from Tel-el-Barud to Cairo, seventy-four and a half miles. These roads might enable the English to approach the capital, provided they march at an early day. In less than a month Arabi can cut the banks of the Nile and flood the country between him and the enemy, besides destroying the railroads and the bridges over which they cross the rivers. He has already flooded the defences in his front on the line at Kafr-el-Douar by damming the Mahmoudieh Canal. His next line is between Damanhoor, running from Dessook on the Rosetta branch of the Nile to Lake Mareotis, west of Damanhoor. This is stronger and better than the one he now holds and is thirty-nine miles from Alexandria. He can only be turned by going round the lake to the west, some forty miles, over a sandy desert. Another line could be formed at Tel-el-Barud, but not so strong. If forced from here he can form a powerful line at Kafr-Zayat, on the south bank of the Rosetta branch of the Nile. If the Nile is ready for action he can flood the opposite bank, and, destroying the bridge across the river, can stop any further progress in that direction. There will not be a dry spot to plant a battery upon, and it will thus be impossible to cross the river. The next line will be in front of Tanta, a fine city of seventy thousand people, situated in the centre of the Delta. It is a long line, nearly thirty miles, but he has both branches of the Nile to protect his flanks, by means of which he can soften the ground on his front, while protecting the railroads on his right flank running to Mansurah and Damietta, and from Mansurah to Abukibir and Zigazig, and so on to Bena, situated on the south side of the Damietta branch of the Nile. This city is twenty-five miles in the rear of the city of Tanta. The Mansurah Road joins at Bena, the direct one from Alexandria to Cairo and is thirty miles distant from Cairo. At Bena there is another strong line situated like Kafr-Zayat and the same defences operate here. The next strong line is from the railroad on the west bank of the Nile, at El Menashi, across the Barrage, where the two branches of the Nile are dammed to irrigate the Delta. On the east bank, at the forks of the river, is a strong fortification which, with the Barrage, stops any gunboat from ascending further. It is twelve miles below Cairo. The line runs from here east by the way of Kelioub and across the desert to the Arabian Hills. These are his last and strongest lines of defence. They offer the double object of defending an advance from Alexandria and Ismailia, cutting all lines of railroads leading to Cairo from either of these cities, and also the old track which leads across the desert directly from Suez to Cairo. You will see from this statement how hopeless at this season is an advance from Alexandria, and the powerful adjuncts that Arabi can make use of to defeat his enemy. Unless he does this he is an idiot playing with forked lightning and should not have undertaken a great revolution.

“A month ago I wrote an article, knowing the difficulties of the line of which we were speaking, and I then said that the English commander would undoubtedly take the line from Ismailia as the only one with any of the chances of success. To do this all the promises of Lesseps would be violated and his leading France out of Alexandria at the critical moment go for nothing. Arabi Pacha, lulled by the word of the able Frenchman, was kept from the canal, persuaded that he and France would see that neutrality was observed. He had failed, with all his diplomacy, to read England right or to know the influence of Lesseps, and too late finds that he has been outwitted by both England and Lesseps, and that old Mehemet Ali was wise in refusing to cut the canal, following the advice of Necho, the Pharaoh of 2,500 years before, for the simple reason that England would overwhelm his country from that direction should he grant the privilege of cutting the canal through the Isthmus of Suez. The English have now their base at Ismailia, on Lake Temseh, through which the canal passes, and it is beyond doubt their safest and best way to Cairo at this season. The advance here forces upon Arabi the best defence that can be made at the important city of Zagazig or Tel-el-Kebir. It is one of the centres of agriculture and commerce, and at which railroads meet coming from Suez, Ismailia, Alexandria, Bena and Cairo. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to make a strong defence, and he will undoubtedly do it. He must rely upon softening the ground in his front by the means of the large canal, which passes by here from the Nile to Ismailia and which is on his left flank; depending upon the desert for his right flank, extending to the Arabian Hills. It takes a large force, but he must have the troops here; otherwise the whole Delta will come into possession of the English, his rear in the direction of Alexandria be turned and the principal lines of railroads in Egypt be captured. The English are now passing over ground that Arabi finds incapable of defence except by actual encounter in the open field.”

“How do you think the forces of Arabi have behaved on this line in their encounters thus far?”

“It must be recollected that Arabi and his troops are now to war. The desperate charges they have made upon the English who were behind their breastworks, and were saved by their cavalry, show better than I expected. The charge of cavalry was under extraordinary circumstances. Experience will guard against a similar encounter in the future.”

“After leaving a sufficient force to prevent an advance from Alexandria how much force can he bring on the field at Zagazig?”

“Arabi ought to have by this time, after leaving a sufficient force at Alexandria to defend his line, at least forty to fifty thousand well armed troops of all arms.”

“Then how many men do you think he can count upon altogether for this campaign?”

“At least 100,000 well armed men, mostly with the Remington rifle and the Krupp gun, with an abundance of ammunition, and an indefinite number of Bedouins for harassing the enemy’s flanks and lines of communication. From Zagazig to Kelioub, which is forty and a half miles, there are other lines—that between Bena and Belrays and between Shibbin-el-Kanatir and Bena. The country, however, has so much sameness from Zagazig to Kelioub it is difficult to tell at what points Arabi will defend between them.”

“Please state, General, the army organization as it exists as near as you can?”

“I have not my notes with me and must rely upon my memory. There were in 1877 and 1878 about fifty thousand of all arms in Lower Egypt and nearly that number in Upper Egypt extending into the Soudan. There were a large number who had been disciplined and drilled and who were discharged in 1878 and 1879 from the service—probably as many as ten thousand men. There are in Lower Egypt something over forty thousand infantry, armed with the Remington rifle. The remainder are artillery and cavalry—the artillery with the Krupp and other guns and the cavalry with Colt’s pistol, sabre and lance. Besides, they have quite a number of Gatling guns.”

“What is the condition of the quartermaster and commissary department?”

“The Arab is simple in his diet. He lives upon bread, now and then mutton and beef, rice, beans and a few other vegetables, a small quantity of coffee and now and then sugar. Everything is cooked with a common kind of butter, sometimes oil—very little else. Of these things, or their equivalent, for his diet there is an inexhaustible supply. For transportation they use no wagons, but invariably the camel, horse, mule, donkey or buffalo, of which there is an abundant supply. The troops require no shelter, being accustomed to the heat of the noonday sun, and lie upon palm mats at night often without covering of any kind. Their forage is barley and chopped straw, and ample for all their wants.”

“How can Arabi maintain his ordnance and its supplies?”

“They have on the desert a short distance from Cairo a large manufactory of very good powder, and at Cairo extensive means of manufacturing cartridges with caps in an unlimited quantity. There was machinery obtained from the United States for the manufacture of small arms in 1876 or 1878, which may be in operation now, and there was also arranged a foundry for cannon. Whether the latter is in operation now or otherwise I don’t know. General Stone was urgent on all these subjects, and advised the Khedive to keep all his old iron to make cannon and projectiles.”

“Can you conjecture what kind of a staff Arabi Pacha may have?”

“He has a large number of highly instructed young Arabs who were educated to a great extent in the same course of instruction our cadets have at West Point. This important institution, new to that people, was organized on the recommendation of General Stone. There is no doubt that Arabi can present as effective a staff in all departments as most young armies possess.”

“When was their military school established?”

“It was commenced by Mehemet Ali and largely improved by Said Pacha, his son; but upon the coming of the Americans it underwent an entire change. A large number of modern studies were introduced, modelled after West Point. Distinguished officers like Generals Grant and Sherman expressed their surprise at the admirable system of the school and the drill, discipline and fine appearance of the soldiery under the new régime.”

“What are the means of enforcing discipline in the Egyptian army?”

“Now, I want to tell you about that. The discipline of Arabi was peculiar, having wonderful influence with officers and men. I think his religious character had much to do with keeping his command under control, he having comparatively few deserters when desertion was a common thing in other commands. The principal punishment was ball and chain at hard labor on the public works. For great criminals they reserved deportation to the Soudan. With Arabi it was a sort of personal magnetism which attracted officers and men to him, he having a kind of religious halo about him. That which I particularly observed was his frequent prayers. I have been reminded of an incident only to-day by Captain Morgan, who was one of my aides-de-camp in Egypt at the time. A large number of men belonging to the regiment of Arabi had neglected their accoutrements and arms. Fault being found he openly excused them, because they were called to prayer. This will give a correct idea of Arabi Pacha. There is no doubt he was then laying his plans deep and strong for the power he now possesses.”

“Is the army in Upper Egypt as well armed and equipped as that of Lower Egypt?”

“No, it is not, but it is at the same time effective. They have many arms of an old pattern. Those in service sent there from Lower Egypt have the Remington rifle.”

“Is that army available, and if so to what extent?”

“There is a kind of religious revolution now progressing in Upper Egypt, extending into the Soudan, under the inspiration of an enthusiast calling himself a prophet, and who lately defeated a strong force sent out by the Khedive against him. The papers say he has joined forces with Arabi and will no doubt materially aid him. The forces of Upper Egypt, if not with him now, soon will be. A railway runs up the Nile 200 miles above Cairo and steamboats as high as the Second Cataract, and a telegraph line as far as there are any troops.”

“Do you think that the attitude and purposes of Arabi have tended to awaken anything like patriotism among the Egyptians?”

“I will answer that in this way. There was no such thing as patriotism among the Arabs. They looked upon the government as their natural enemy. They hated the Turks and Circassians as the ruling class and oppressors thrown over them by a despotic government, who made them feel that they were their masters. They love their families and their mud huts—their religion above all else. They are drawn to Arabi because he is an Arab and the representative not only of their religion but of their race. For the first time in centuries there may be born some notions of patriotism.”

“What mistakes has Arabi made in his defence thus far?”

“The most important is that he did not block up and break the Suez Canal to prevent the advance from Kantara or Ismailia, to prevent the co-operation of the forces from the Mediterranean and from India. This mistake, as indicated already, was probably due to the diplomacy of Lesseps.”

“What effect, in your opinion, will the recent encounters between the Arabs and the English which have happened on the road to Zagazig have upon the troops of Arabi?”

“I think the valuable experience will benefit their morale. They have learned that they can meet English infantry, and, guarding against an extraordinary cavalry night attack, fight with more confidence.”

“General, will you now tell me what force, in your judgment, ought the English to have to overcome Arabi and occupy Egypt?”

“With a sufficient force to hold Alexandria they ought to have from 30,000 to 40,000 of all arms in a determined and vigorous advance from Ismailia. They have witnessed the courage of the Egyptians in an open field fight against them behind breastworks. The probability is that hereafter they will have to attack their enemy fortified, when they fight as determinedly as any troops I have ever known. For instance, in Abyssinia I witnessed 2,500 defeated Arabs make a resolute and splendid defence against an attacking column of 8,000, with 40,000 to 50,000 Abyssinians close by urging them on. Young officers and men were frequently shot dead; and their companions instantly marched up to exposed positions with as much courage and coolness as witnessed among the bravest soldiers.”

“What will be the natural obstacles in the topography of the country and the effect of the climate which the English will have to encounter?”

“Supposing that they overcome any defences there may be at Tel-el-Kebir and Abu Hamad on the way to Zagazig and at Abu Kibir or other points on the road from Kantara to Zagazig they will find at or near the latter place no very formidable obstacles, except hastily constructed defences, with the desert on each side to protect them and the canal to soften their front, with several smaller canals to cross; but they must expect formidable resistance there. When they get to the line from El Menashi running over the Nile at the Barrage to Kelioub, and thence to the Arabian Hills, they will meet, as already stated, with natural obstacles improved by art. Siege guns will be required, particularly at the fortification near the Barrage. The papers say that there is a siege train on the way from Malta. Four miles in the rear of this position and eight miles from Cairo there is a short and strong line at Heliopolis which can be used as an effective support to the Barrage position and check any flank movement. These are the last lines of defence before Cairo. At Cairo there is the strongly fortified position called the Citadel, situated in the suburbs. While commanding the city it is itself commanded. Another spur immediately in rear of it was used by Mehemet Ali in 1805 to shell his friend Kourshid Pacha out of the Citadel, and which led to his appointment as Governor General of Egypt by the Sultan and eventually established the dynasty of which Tewfik, his great grandson, is the Khedive.”

“How about the climate?”

“The climate of Egypt is healthy. There is very little fever. The hot sun at noon will seriously affect the British soldiers. Change of diet and difference of temperature, between the heat of the day and the cool nights toward morning, will produce what is incident to all campaigns—diarrhea—and will seriously damage the English. But the most serious trouble will be upon their cavalry horses. They cannot stand the heat and desert travel. The recent engagement has used them up for some time. There are no dirt roads in the country, particularly at this season, and for a forward movement the railroads must be entirely relied upon, and unless the movement is made at once a day may decide the campaign this season. Arabi may seriously damage the railroads by flooding from the canal, along the bank of which it runs, and as the Nile is now rising rapidly it may be done immediately. At Zagazig or west of that place it is possible that the fresh water canals may be cut in front of the Egyptian field works. This will in consequence require a shorter line and smaller force for its defence, compelling the British to flank their position by the desert and Arabian Hills, which may be resisted effectively. Such a flank movement will be met by Arabi’s two lines of defence at the Barrage and Heliopolis. If Arabi determines to flood the Delta, sacrificing the crop of cotton to a great extent and jeopardizing the wheat and other crops, for the next year, this would of course prevent any advance from Alexandria. If he falls back from his railroad centre at Zagazig he must do it or abandon them to the British. Doing this will enable him to bring his entire force from before Alexandria and concentrate his whole army upon his short lines. In that event it will require every soldier it is possible for the English to bring to their aid. If he does not inundate it will be because he has confidence in the sufficiency of his army. It is therefore obvious the English campaign should not only be sharp and quick, but with the utmost audacity, and that with a sufficient force. A serious check to the English would virtually end the campaign this fall and throw it over until next March or April and might be attended with disaster. It will then enable Arabi to cement his power in Egypt and rally to his standard all of North Africa, Arabia, Syria and Turkey. Then again European complications might occur and which may eventuate in war elsewhere.”

“In case Wolseley succeeds in driving Arabi back to the Barrage and Heliopolis lines would not the loss of the Delta, with its agricultural resources, cause a disastrous depression in his army and among his people?”

“It would undoubtedly do so to a great extent. It is for that reason, as I have already said, that it was important to hold Tel-el-Kebir and Zagazig and have pictured the consequences of so serious a disaster as losing his hold here, for it might necessitate the cutting of the banks of the Nile to drown out the English, bringing ruin alike to the Arabs and their enemy. It will take all the power of Arabi, aided by his Mohammedan associates (ulemas and sheiks), who are so ably supporting him, to stem the torrent of distress and disappointment.”

“Then you believe, General, that Arabi may be compelled to flood the Delta?”

“Yes. You will remember that I have stated that already; I have even gone so far as to say that, now that he has created a great revolution and war, he may think it best for him to follow it to the ‘bitter end’—even if, like Samson, he pulls the pillars down and scatters widespread ruin over the land. He may do this as a last hope, and his people may stand by him in preference to coming again under the despotic rule of the Khedive, his carpet-bag government and Circassian hordes, sustained by British bayonets. They know what it is to endure the tender mercies of the kourbash, and they will naturally be unwilling to submit to pay not only the English and French bondholders, but also the enormous losses and expenses of the present war.”

“When is the Nile navigable?”

“There is rarely more than three to six feet of water at the mouths of the Nile at any time. It is deeper at the Damietta branch than the other. For the small craft used on the Nile it is navigable at all seasons; for good-sized steamers from July to March and April, as far as the Second Cataract, a distance of over seven hundred miles from Cairo—passing the First Cataract in small boats to where a steamer is kept to continue the voyage to the Second Cataract. Vessels which can enter the mouths of the rivers can navigate the Nile at all seasons to Cairo. My recollection is that never more than six feet of water at the entrance of these rivers can be depended upon. Tolerably strong but not very formidable fortifications exist for the protection of these mouths. The bars could be improved, but not in time for this campaign.”

“General, what are the chances of a British column approaching Cairo from Suez?”

“The only way without great difficulty is by the railroad to Ismailia, and over the route Wolseley is now marching. Said Pacha constructed a railroad directly across the desert, ninety miles from Suez to Cairo. It was a good road when I travelled it, twenty-three years ago, but for many years it has been abandoned and the iron removed. There are two other trails still further back in the mountains—the one formerly used by the Overland Anglo-Indian mail and the other by the pilgrims to Mecca. The difficulties attending these routes induces nearly every one to take the longer route of 159 miles by the way of Ismailia to Suez. With camels for men and baggage it can be made in four or five days. About 325 miles above Cairo is the town of Keneh, on the Nile, just below Thebes. It was from here that the great caravans formerly crossed, and even now sometimes traverse the desert of 119½ miles to Kosseir, a small village, immediately on the Red Sea. The English on their way from India, anxious to see the ruins of ancient Egypt, formerly landed here and crossed on camels to either Keneh or Thebes. For the simple traveller there are abundant camels, but for a military column it would require long preparation, and it is not probable an expeditionary force would attempt it. Yet Egypt always had an eye to its defence.”

“What sort of government would you think best suited to Egypt in case the English succeed?”

“When the Khedive Ismail was driven from his throne I thought his removal would be fatal to Egypt; that he was the only ruler who could control that people under the condition of things that was there when I left, and that like Egypt, England and France would come to grief in consequence. Realizing his monetary difficulties, having embarrassed his immense estates and expended the great sums borrowed into beautiful cities and extensive public improvements (much of it wasted in bribing the Sultan and others to keep the peace with him), experience satisfied him that it was necessary to change his policy. Therefore this man of sleepless energy and wonderful ability was sincere in the desire to pay his honest debts. It would have been well to have been considerate to such a man. If properly treated, kindly in his nature, he would have shaped his policy to have satisfied his creditors, but driving him to desperation by harsh measures too well known to dwell upon he unfortunately turned too soon upon his persecutors, giving an excuse for forcing his abdication. Intent upon the ‘pound of flesh,’ thinking the army and people a degraded race, alarmed at the power of England and France, he never dreamed that these beasts of burden would ever raise an arm in their own defence. When under the control of these great Powers, with Tewfik the nominal ruler, in continuing their high handed policy a sentinel was placed at every avenue whence a piastre could be collected. When these wonderful carpet-baggers sent their tax collector to seize upon the glittering prize an English writer states that the people came to the bastinado from choice, by way of protest. Accustomed to the lash it was a pleasure to bare their backs to the kourbash before paying their last piastre. On coming to the throne Tewfik in his treaty gave all power to the two great nations. Of ordinary capacity and vacillating in his policy, well instructed and a gentleman in all his instincts, he has kept his faith in the great trial of the last few days. The world witnesses with surprise the condition that these three contracting Powers have brought Egypt into, and how they are to solve the enigma is a mystery, unless, maybe, it is the fruit of the aggressive policy of and so arranged by Disraeli for the glory and greatness of England, only to lead to the possession of Egypt. Gladstone, who antagonized his illustrious predecessor in every particular, is thus made the unwilling instrument in carrying out the designs of the great statesman. It may be that ‘he will place himself firmly on the banks of the Nile in the seat of the faithful, with his eyes stretched far away to his loved India.’ Of course the Arab would prefer one of his own race, but any government rather than an ‘oligarchy of hyenas’ like that of the present Khedive and his horde of Circassians, with no hold upon them unless sustained by British bayonets. It would be terrible to them to be forced back again to the kourbash and made to pay not only the demands of the bondholders but the expenses of this most unjust and cruel war. These people are naturally a docile and amiable race, anxious for instruction. No people could be more easily led into progress and civilization. In their present enlightenment their government, like their religion, must be enforced by the strong arm of power. A lion in her path, England should own Egypt. No government could better rule her, but she must throw the shield of her own laws over her. In that event the religion of her people would rapidly ameliorate and slavery would in reality be abolished. These relics of barbarism removed, no country would sooner rise from her ashes than poor Egypt, as wonderful in her ancient as she is pitiable in her modern ruins.”